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In a number of papers A.J. Oswald (1996, 1997) argues that high rates of home ownership 
may imply inferior labour market outcomes. This paper tests the Oswald hypothesis in a panel 
of 42 Belgian districts since the 1970s. The use of data going back to 1970 allows us to 
embed the Oswald hypothesis in a broader model including other key determinants of 
employment like labour costs and productivity, the skill level of the population, and 
demography. Considering that ownership may be endogenous to (shocks in) employment, we 
use IV estimation methods. Overall, we find evidence in favour of the Oswald hypothesis. We 
observe that a 1 percentage point rise in the rate of home ownership in a district implies a 
statistically significant fall in the employment rate by about 0.3 percentage points. Our results 
underscore the importance of including other determinants of employment, of controlling for 
unobserved fixed regional and time effects, and of appropriately dealing with endogeneity. 
Disregarding these issues, as is often done in the macro labour literature, may imply very 
different estimation results. Additional estimation reveals that the size of the Oswald effect 
falls in the fraction of high skilled in a district. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout  recent  history,  governments  in  many  countries  have  encouraged  home-ownership. 
Ownership is seen as a secure way for the population to accumulate assets. Moreover, ownership 
generates significant social benefits. Owners are more likely to have long residence spells, which 
contributes to local neighbourhood stability and to the accumulation of social capital (DiPasquale and 
Glaeser, 1999; Rohe et al., 2002; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2010). Renters do not 
bring about the same returns due to their higher degree of geographical mobility. From a labour 
market perspective, however, rising degrees of home ownership are much more controversial. Home 
ownership may restrict geographical mobility, and imply inferior labour market outcomes, both for 
the individual and in the aggregate. Oswald (1996, 1997a,b,c) was among the first to advance this 
argument. If demand for labour falls in a region, home owners will be less inclined to move to more 
prosperous regions mainly due to high costs of selling and buying homes. Renters by contrast can 
move  at  much  lower  cost.  In  equilibrium,  higher  degrees  of  home  ownership  imply  higher 
unemployment. Empirically, Oswald’s evidence in favour of his hypothesis relies mainly on cross 
country macroeconomic data, and on aggregate data for regions within individual countries. Oswald 
(1996) observed higher unemployment rates in OECD countries with a higher fraction of owners 
(versus renters). Also, he found that since the 1970s the unemployment rate increased most in those 
countries with the strongest growth in the rate of ownership. According to his results, an increase of 
the rate of ownership with 10 percentage points causes an increase of the unemployment rate with 2 
percentage points.  
The Oswald hypothesis has provoked a large body of theoretical and empirical work. In a recent 
survey, Coulson and Fisher (2009) show that a change of theoretical assumptions may generate 
results that differ from Oswald’s, both for individual home owners and for the aggregate labour 
market. Empirically, a wave of studies has not settled the issue, although it may be possible to 
observe some structure in the results. Studies using microeconomic data very often challenge the 
Oswald hypothesis, and find home owners to have better employment positions (e.g. Coulson and 
Fisher, 2002, 2009; Robson, 2003; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006, 2008). 
Studies using macroeconomic data are more often in line with Oswald (e.g. Partridge and Rickman, 
1997; Pehkonen, 1997; Nickell, 1998; Nickell et al. 2005; Cochrane and Poot, 2007), although various 
researchers obtain dissident or insignificant results (Flatau et al., 2002; Barrios Garia and Hernandez, 
2004, Coulson and Fisher, 2009; Lerbs, 2010). Overall, it is difficult however to draw convincing 
conclusions from these macro studies due to their imperfect or limited econometric setup. 
This paper tests the Oswald hypothesis in a panel of 42 Belgian districts (‘arrondissements’) since the 
1970s
1. Along the time dimension we have data for six years between 1970 and 2005. Our dependent 
variable is the employment rate, the fraction of working age population with a job. Our approach and 
data availability are such that we avoid three limitations in existing empirical macro studies. First, 
many macro studies lack data along the time dimension, which makes it impossible to control for 
unobserved fixed effects, and which may lead to seriously biased estimates. The availability of data 
since the 1970s enables us to control for fixed effects. Moreover, it allows us to include in this study 
the periods with most labour market turbulence since the second World War, and to embed the 
Oswald hypothesis in a broader model including various other determinants of employment like 
labour costs and productivity, skill level of the population, demographic variables, etc. If the time 
                                                           
1 Appendix 1 contains a map and some more information on these districts.   3 
dimension is short, and data availability limited, it clearly becomes difficult to estimate the effects of 
only slowly changing variables like skill level, and demography. Only Oswald (1996, 1997a, 1997b), 
Partridge and Rickman (1997), Green and Herdershott (2001) and Nickell et al. (2005) exploit data for 
the 1970s and the 1980s. Second, most existing macro studies neglect the possibility of reverse 
causality. Yet, due to the potential influence of employment in a region on permanent income and 
tenure choice of households in that region, ownership may be endogenous to changes (shocks) in 
employment. Empirically this would require the use of IV techniques. We employ these in this paper. 
We  estimate  by  means  of  2SLS  a  simultaneous  equations  model  explaining  the  rate  of  home 
ownership and the employment rate. Barrios Garcia and Rodriguez Hernandez (2004), Cochrane and 
Poot (2007) and Coulson and Fisher (2009) are the only studies we know to have used IV-methods 
before. Third, observing the Oswald effect is (only) one thing. Another may be to understand what 
determines  its  size,  and  economic  significance.  Our  relatively  large  panel  along  both  the  cross-
sectional and time dimension allows us to test various interaction effects which may shed light on 
this. We test the role of structural geographic and schooling related variables. Among these variables 
are the proximity of a border (country or language border), population density, the skill level of the 
population, etc.  
Our main findings are as follows. We find evidence in favour of the Oswald hypothesis. We observe 
that a 1 percentage point rise in the rate of home ownership in a district implies a statistically (and 
economically) significant fall in the employment rate by about 0.3 percentage points. Our results 
show the importance of including other determinants of employment, and of controlling for both 
fixed regional effects and time effects. If we do not do this, the estimated Oswald effect can be 
totally different, highly insignificant, close to zero and sometimes even positive. Our results also 
demonstrate that the estimated effects may be biased when endogeneity of home ownership is 
disregarded.  Not  using  IV  techniques  implies  a  smaller  Oswald  effect.  Although  this  paper  only 
concerns Belgium, our empirical findings may shed some light on why the existing empirical macro 
literature has difficulty coming to robust conclusions. As to the size of the Oswald effect, we find that 
it falls in the fraction of high skilled in a district. We also obtain indicative results that the Oswald 
effect may be stronger in more densely populated districts and in districts closer to borders, and that 
it may be weaker in districts that are closer to one of the five major cores of economic activity in 
Belgium, but these findings are not statistically significant. Among our other results, we observe 
negative effects on the employment rate in a district of the ratio of wage costs to productivity, and 
(insignificant)  positive  effects  of  the  fraction  of  high  skilled.  In  the  ownership  equation  we  find 
negative effects of the relative cost of living as owner versus renter. This opens possibilities for the 
government to affect home ownership by means of tax changes. Finally, in both the employment 
equation  and  the  ownership  equation,  we  see  a  (time-varying)  influence  of  some  demographic 
variables, like the age structure of the population. Often, however, this influence is not statistically 
significant.  
In Section 2 of the paper we briefly review the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between housing and jobs. Section 3 describes our econometric model. We build on the 
literature on tenure choice initiated by Rosen (1979) and Rosen and Rosen (1980) to model home 
ownership. Our analysis of equilibrium employment is situated within the New Keynesian competing 
claims approach developed mainly by Layard et al. (1991). Here we also take into account specific 
characteristics of wage setting in Belgium. Section 4 describes our dataset. Section 5 presents the 
results of our econometric analysis. We summarize our main findings in Section 6.  
   4 
2. Home ownership and employment: a brief review of the literature 
(Un)employment  rates  differ  widely  across  regions  in  most  countries,  including  Belgium. 
Geographical mobility can be a vigorous instrument to eliminate these differences by shifting labour 
supply from high to low unemployment regions. Theoretically, higher wages or a higher probability 
to find a (suitable) job in prosperous areas could bring about this shift. Empirical evidence shows that 
the latter is the most important motivation for workers to be mobile (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; 
Böheim and Taylor, 2002). However, whether an economic agent decides to work in another region 
depends not only on expected benefits. Moving also generates costs: search and transaction costs 
when  selling  and  buying  a  house,  commuting  costs,  uncertainty,  costs  to  overcome  cultural  or 
language barriers, personal costs when leaving familiar surroundings, etc.  
Oswald  (1996,  1997a,b,c)  emphasizes  the  negative  effects  of  home  ownership  on  geographical 
mobility and labour market performance. Oswald (1997c) describes a perfectly competitive economy 
with two separate locations that are joined by a road. People have to live in one of them, either as 
owner or as renter. Each location experiences real shocks to labour demand. Tenure choice is made 
before these shocks are revealed. When their region is hit by a bad shock, renters can move to the 
other  region  at  no  cost.  Owners  in  the  bad  region  either  remain  unemployed  and  accept 
unemployment benefits, commute to the better region at a commuting cost, or pay a fixed (high) 
transaction cost and move. The commuting cost rises in the number of commuters. At some number 
of commuters this cost becomes equal to the transaction cost of moving. Due to commuting or 
moving costs, owners will have a higher reservation wage for jobs in the other location. As a result, 
labour supply to each location is horizontal at a low level of wages up to the number of owners in 
that location and the total number of renters in the economy
2. It then becomes upward sloping as 
higher wages will be necessary to induce (rising numbers of) owners from the other location to 
commute. Labour supply becomes horizontal again when commuting costs have risen to the level of 
the transaction cost of moving. Everyone is willing to work in a good region at a wage that covers 
both the unemployment benefit and moving costs. In the end the position of the labour demand 
curve  determines  equilibrium  quantities  and  wages.  Given  the competitive  nature of  the  labour 
market, owners and renters receive the same wage offers. Due to their higher reservation wage at 
distant jobs, owners are more likely to be unemployed. Renters are fully employed. Furthermore, at 
the aggregate level, higher degrees of home ownership imply a leftward shift of the upward sloping 
part of the labour supply curve. Lower equilibrium employment, higher unemployment and higher 
wages are the result. 
Oswald’s arguments may be strengthened by a number of complementary considerations. 
First, if long distance commuting contributes to traffic congestion, overall production costs may rise, 
which further undermines employment. Hymel (2009) provides recent empirical proof of congestion 
damping employment growth in U.S. metropolitan areas. Furthermore, if the overall promotion of 
home ownership undermines the development of a well functioning rental market, it will also be 
more difficult for unemployed renters to move to other regions (Oswald, 1999). Traffic congestion 
and  a  tight  rental  market  imply  that  the  disadvantages  of  home  ownership  are  not  necessarily 
concentrated in the segment of owners. 
  Nickell (1998) and Nickell and Layard (1999) embed Oswald’s argument in an imperfectly 
competitive macro model of the labour market. In this model equilibrium (un)employment reconciles 
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competing claims of wage and price setters. Any factor which raises targeted price or wage mark-ups 
will imply higher equilibrium unemployment. An important determinant of the price mark-up is the 
degree  of  product  market  competition.  Wage  mark-ups  depend  on  the  unemployment  benefit 
system, union power and the characteristics of wage bargaining, labour taxes, etc. Ownership is 
important  in  this  setup  as  a  determinant  of  wage  pressure.  Following  Oswald,  rising  rates  of 
ownership imply reduced mobility and search effectiveness among the unemployed. The employed 
can then claim a higher wage mark-up. Ownership may also raise the mark-up of prices on wages 
because  non-wage costs may  rise:  hiring  costs  (if  it  becomes more  difficult to  fill  in vacancies), 
congestion costs, etc. Overall, equilibrium unemployment will rise. 
 
More  recent  theoretical  work  has  reconsidered  and/or  extended  Oswald’s  assumptions  and 
conclusions. Dohmen (2005) basically confirms Oswald’s results but emphasizes the role of education 
and skills. Workers only move to another region in Dohmen’s model when the wage in that region 
exceeds the unemployment benefit and the cost of changing location. Since the latter cost is higher 
for home owners, owners will be less mobile and face higher unemployment, as in Oswald. Rising 
ownership  rates  then  go  along  with  inferior  labour  market  performance.  Skill  differences  may 
however  disturb  this  simple  pattern.  Skilled  workers  earn  high  wages,  which  may  exceed  the 
unemployment benefit plus relocation cost. As a consequence, the skilled may both be owner and 
mobile. Their mobility raises their chances to find a job. The low skilled, however, earn wages below 
the sum of the unemployment benefit and the cost of changing location. As a consequence, when a 
low skilled owner loses his job, he will not move, and remain unemployed. Low skilled renters by 
contrast remain mobile. The implication of Dohmen’s model for empirical work is important. When 
testing the relationship between ownership and labour market outcomes, it is crucial to control for 
skill levels. An adverse effect of rising ownership can only be expected to hold when skills are kept 
constant  in  the  regression.  Furthermore,  above  a  certain  skill  level,  there  need  not  be  any 
relationship between ownership and employment.  
Munch et al. (2006) raise another possibility which may undermine the Oswald hypothesis. 
Due to high costs of moving, owners will not only have a higher reservation wage for distant jobs, 
they  will  also  have  a  lower  reservation  wage  for  local  jobs.  It  is  therefore  possible  that  rising 
ownership goes along with higher employment, but then this should be at lower wages. Brunet and 
Havet (2009) confirm this idea for French workers. Home owners in their study are more wage 
downgraded (and feel more overeducated) than renters. In line with this, Rouwendal and Nijkamp 
(2006) find empirical prove for lower geographical mobility of home owners but also for higher exit 
rates from unemployment. The latter is due to more intensive search activity and faster acceptance 
of jobs on the local labour market, especially by highly leveraged owners. Munch et al. (2008) add 
that increased willingness to accept local jobs need not imply lower actual wages. Immobility may 
cause  owners  to  invest  more  in  their  local  jobs,  increasing  firm-specific  productivity.  The 
establishment of a long-term employment relationship may also raise the incentive for firms to train 
their workers-owners.  
Coulson  and  Fisher  (2009)  discuss  the  Oswald  hypothesis  within  a  model  of  search  and 
bargaining in the style of Pissarides (1990). Owners face higher unemployment than renters in this 
model because they search on a smaller scale. Because their search is narrower, owners have less 
bargaining power, which implies that firms can make them work at lower wages. The latter effect is 
important because it implies that an aggregate rise in ownership reduces expected wages and raises 
expected profits for firms. Higher expected profits may cause new firms to enter. Under certain 
assumptions this favourable entry effect may dominate the unfavourable (standard) composition   6 
effect according to which an increase in the number of (immobile) owners undermines overall labour 
market performance. 
 
Theoretical  ambiguity  underscores  the  relevance  of  empirical  work  on  the  Oswald  hypothesis. 
Empirical studies do not settle the issue, however, certainly not when it comes to aggregate effects. 
Among studies that make use of micro data one can observe some degree of consensus. Most of 
these studies find home owners to have a better employment status than renters (see e.g. Coulson 
and Fisher, 2002, 2009, for the US; Robson, 2003, for the UK; van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004, for 
the Netherlands; Munch et al., 2006, 2008, for Denmark). A related, but somewhat different issue is 
whether individual owners are also more mobile after becoming unemployed. Here the answer is less 
clear. For example, Henley (1998) finds residential mobility to be rather unresponsive to labour 
market conditions in the UK. He does not find owners to move from high unemployment more easily. 
Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find no effect of ownership on ‘job-to-job mobility’. 
Empirical studies using macro data cannot confirm the message emanating from the (more or 
less) micro consensus. Many macro studies confirm the Oswald hypothesis that a rise in the rate of 
home ownership goes along with inferior labour market results (see Table 1 for an overview). The 
question is how strong and robust this finding is. On the one hand, contradiction between micro and 
macro findings is perfectly possible. As we have mentioned before, rising degrees of home ownership 
may cause negative effects (congestion, tightening of rental markets, bargained wage pressure,…) 
beyond the owners themselves. Even if they are not worse off, aggregate labour market performance 
may be weaker. Clearly, the aggregate story is important for policy makers. On the other hand, many 
macro studies may be challenged on methodological grounds. Our summary in Table 1 reveals that 
many studies have only one observation along the time dimension which makes it impossible to 
control for fixed regional/country effects. This also makes it more difficult to embed the Oswald 
hypothesis in a broader model explaining (un)employment, where also differences in wages and 
productivity, skills, sectoral structure, demography, etc. have their role. Furthermore, only Barrios 
Garcia and Rodriguez Hernandez (2004), Cochrane and Poot (2007) and Coulson and Fisher (2009) 
control for endogeneity of home ownership by means of IV methods. Yet, both theoretically and 
empirically, housing tenure choices have been found to be determined also by one’s employment 
prospects and permanent income (e.g. Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Henley, 1998; van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning, 2004). Neglecting the possibility of reverse causality could bias the estimates. In the next 
sections we try to overcome these limitations in an empirical macro study for Belgium.  
 
3. Econometric model 
In this section we derive the empirical model that guides our analysis in the next sections. We 
develop a two equation system explaining home ownership and employment rates. Our empirical 
setup for home ownership relies on work on tenure choice by Rosen (1979) and Rosen and Rosen 
(1980). Our setup for the labour market is mainly inspired by Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell and 
Layard (1999). Their approach to model the determination of wages and employment corresponds 
most closely to the Belgian situation. We rely on Oswald (1997c) and some of the literature that we 
summarized in Section 2 when it comes to the effects of changes in ownership. 
Micro tenure choice is commonly modelled as a function of the relative cost of living as owner versus 
living  as  renter,  household  permanent  income,  and  a  number  of  social  and  demographic 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Empirical studies of the Oswald hypothesis using macro data.   8 
model a simple empirical specification that explains the macro proportion of home owner-occupiers 
in  the  population  in  the  US.  Next  to  the  relative  cost  and  a  proxy  for  permanent  income  they 
consider  explanatory  variables  like  a  measure  for  credit  availability,  income  distribution, 
demographic variables like percentages of the population by age class, the percentage of families 
without  children,  etc.  Many  other  studies  have  estimated  similar  equations  for  other  countries. 
Barrios Garcia and Rodriguez Hernandez (2004) provide a recent example within the context of a test 
of  the  Oswald  hypothesis  for  Spain.  They  also  provide  a  wider  survey  of  empirical  literature 
explaining tenure choice and aggregate ownership rates. In line with this literature we specify the 
following equation for the home ownership rate (OWNit) in district i and year t. 
         OWNit  = ai + b1 log(RCit) + b2 Emplit + b3 Schoolingit + b4 log(PopDensit) + S bj DemOjit + lot + eit        (1) 
 
              with  1,...,42; i =    1970, 1977, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2005. t =        
 
In this equation RCit is the relative cost - relevant to period t - of living as owner versus renter in 
district i. The data that we include are an average of annual RC data for the period of five years up to 
t. We discuss the construction of RCit in greater detail below. As proxies for permanent income in 
district i and year t, we include the employment rate (Emplit) and a variable measuring the skill level 
of the population (Schoolingit). The employment rate indicates the fraction of all people at working 
age living in the district who have a job
3. Our measure for the skill level will be the fraction of all 
people  older  than  13  in  the  district  with  tertiary  education.  Furthermore,  Equation  (1)  includes 
population density (PopDensit) and a set of demographic variables (DemOjit). Population density acts 
as a proxy for urbanisation, which has in the literature been shown to (negatively) affect the rate of 
ownership (e.g. Fisher and Jaffe, 2003). As to demography, we include the share of two age groups in 
total population (20-34, 35 and older) and the fraction of families without children. Our expectation 
is that larger fractions of people aged 20 to 34 and larger fractions of families without children will go 
along with lower rates of ownership. Younger people generally have less resources, and may prefer 
not yet to enter into long-term commitments or to settle. Households with children, by contrast, may 
be more inclined to settle and prefer the security of a home of their own. Finally, lot captures time 
effects for the year t common to all districts, aI captures fixed regional effects for district i. The way 
we have specified Equation (1) allows for a direct interpretation of coefficients. For example, the 
coefficient b1 indicates the effect on the rate of ownership in percentage points of a 1 percent 
increase in the relative cost; b2 and b3 measure the effects on the rate of ownership in percentage 
points of a 1 percentage point increase in the employment rate and the fraction of high skilled 
respectively. Note that we tested for different functional form specifications, like including in the 
regression log(OWNit) instead of OWNit, RCit instead of log(RCit), log(Emplit) instead of Emplit, etc. Our 
main results were not sensitive to these choices (which is in line with findings by e.g. Rosen and 
Rosen, 1980). We summarize the results of various robustness checks in Appendix 3. 
 
Equation (2) explains the employment rate in district i and year t. It relies strongly on Figure 1, which 
describes the underlying labour market and the determination of the equilibrium number of jobs in 
district i (Li). The latter is clearly a key determinant of the employment rate among the people at 
working age living there. The equilibrium number of jobs in the district (Li) is determined at the inter- 
section of the labour demand curve (Ldi) and the wage setting curve (WSi). Labour demand falls in the 
                                                           
3 Data shortages at the level of individual districts in the 1970s made it impossible to include other proxies like 
consumption per capita or GDP per capita.   9 













real wage per worker (wagei), including taxes on labour. For a given real wage, labour demand is 
negatively affected by real non-wage production costs (nwci) and positively by labour productivity 
(qi). Business cycle and other aggregate labour demand shocks are captured by bc, district-specific 
demand shocks by edi. The wage setting curve (WSi) indicates bargained real wages. It is flat since 
wages in a district are only very weakly affected by local employment conditions. Wages in Belgium 
are mainly bargained at the sectoral level, often within a nationally imposed range. In the period that 
we study, union density exceeds 50%, the coverage rate of collective bargaining exceeds 90% (OECD, 
2004). Wages will therefore mainly reflect sectoral and national variables, like sectoral or aggregate 
labour  productivity  (q)  and  overall  wage  push  variables  (X).  The  latter  include  union  power, 
unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, etc. As mentioned before, Nickell (1998), Layard and Nickell 
(1999) and Nickell et al. (2005) also see a role for aggregate ownership here. The role for local factors 
shifting the WS-curve (eiw) will be very small.  
Equation (2) captures the positive effects of labour productivity in a district, and the negative 
effects of bargained real wages. The parameters g3 and g4 measure the effects on the employment 
rate in percentage points of a 1 percent increase in the real wage (wagei) and productivity (qi) 
respectively. We expect g3 to be negative and g4 to be positive. The main reasons to have the rate of 
ownership  (OWNit)  in  Equation  (2)  –  for  given  wages  and  productivity  –  are  as  follows.  First, 
ownership may affect non-wage labour costs for firms in a district (nwci) due to an increase in traffic 
and congestion costs. Labour demand may shift to the left. Second, the rate of ownership may affect 
the reservation wage, search intensity and overall mobility of inhabitants in the district. Owners may 
have a lower reservation wage, and search more intensively, for local jobs. Given the nature of wage 
bargaining, the influence on wages is likely to be very small. The probability for firms to fill vacancies, 
however,  may  rise,  which  brings  down  non-wage  labour  costs  (hiring  costs),  and  promotes 
employment.  The  third  effect  of  ownership  concerns  the  employment  rate  (Empli)  for  a  given 
number  of  jobs  in  the  district  (Li).  As  argued  by  Oswald  (1997c),  owners  also  have  a  higher 
reservation wage for distant jobs. Given wages in other districts they may therefore have a higher 
probability than renters to be unemployed. The aggregate employment rate in their own district will 
     WSi (q, X, ewi) 
            Li  Li 
e ( , , , ) i di i di L nwc q bc
- + +
 
wagei   10
then  fall,  as  a  smaller  fraction  of  the  population  will  have  a  job.  Which  of  all  these  effects  is 
dominant, remains an empirical issue. 
Finally, Equation (2) includes the skill level of the population (Schoolingit) and a number of 
demographic variables (DemEjit). Schooling captures the idea raised by Dohmen (2005). For a given 
share of owners in a district, overall mobility of the population and expected employment rates will 
rise the higher skill levels. As demographic variables we again consider the share of certain age 
groups among the population. We expect the employment rate in a district to be lower when the 
fractions of the youngest people (age 15-24) and the older people at working age (age 50-64) rise
4. 
Again we control for fixed district effects (di) and common time effects (let). The latter may capture 
the effects of common labour demand shocks (e.g. aggregate business cycle effects, oil shocks). 
 
        Emplit  = di + g1 OWNit + g2 Schoolingit + g3 log(wageit) + g4 log(qit)  + S gj DemEjit  + let + uit       (2) 
 
               with  1,...,42; i =    1970, 1977, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2005. t =       
 
The need for IV estimation techniques is obvious from Equations (1) and (2), and Figure 1. Ownership 
and employment are mutually endogenous, given their reciprocal influence. Wages are endogenous 
to district specific shocks in labour demand and employment, as is clear from Figure 1. Similarly, the 
relative cost of living as owner in a district is endogenous to shocks in the demand for/supply of 
housing property, and the rate of ownership in that district. Schooling may also be endogenous to 
shocks in employment. The literature for example provides ample empirical evidence that schooling 
is  counter-cyclical  (e.g.  DeJong  and  Ingram,  2001;  Heylen  and  Pozzi,  2007).  Positive  shocks  to 
employment may pull young people out of education and into work, and vice versa. We discuss our 
choice of appropriate instruments in Section 5.   
 
In Section 5 we extend our estimated Equations (1) and (2) in three directions. First, we allow for 
time  variation  in  the  effects  of  the  demographic  variables  in  both  equations.  Thinking  about 
ownership, credit availability and/or the frequency of intergenerational transfers may have increased 
over time, raising the possibility for younger people to become owner (OECD, 2011). Also, the age at 
which people prefer to have their own house may have changed over time. Concerning employment, 
preference for leisure may have evolved differently across age groups. In a second extension, we 
take into account constitutional reform in Belgium. Since the end of the 1980s the Flemish and 
Walloon regions have gained much more autonomy in the area of housing policy and economic 
policy, including important aspects of labour market policy (e.g. public employment services and 
training  of  the  unemployed).  We  measure  the  potential  impact  of  different  regional  policies  by 
adding a separate time dummy for all districts in one region (Flanders) for the period since 1990. Our 
third extension aims to shed more light on the determinants of the size of the Oswald effect. To that 
aim we introduce in Equation (2) a number of interaction terms g11 VAR*OWNit, where VAR is a 
variable  that  may  affect  the  size  of  the  Oswald  effect.  This  variable  may  vary  along  the  time 
dimension or the cross-sectional dimension. Variables that we have in mind are the skill level of the 
                                                           
4 Note though that these expectations are unconditional. Controlling for (tertiary) schooling, and wages and 
productivity, expected signs may be less straightforward. Note also that the particular age groups featuring in 
the employment equation differ from those in the ownership equation. Our selection for the employment 
equation reflects well-known differences (in all OECD countries) in labour market participation and unemploy-
ment rates among young, prime-age and older workers. For employment it is obvious to categorize people of 
age  20  differently  from  people  of  age  30,  and  people  of  age  45  differently  from  people  of  age  60.  For 
ownership, however, it is not obvious at all to categorize these people differently.   11
population, population density, the proximity of a country or language border, and the proximity of a 
major centre of economic activity.  
 
4. Data 
We use macro data at the level of Belgian districts. Because of some difficulties in data consistency, 
and because of its different nature, we have omitted the Brussels district. This leaves us with 42 
cross-sections,  22  in  Flanders  and  20  in  the  Walloon  Region  (see  Appendix  1).  As  to  the  time 
dimension, we are limited to the years in which a census or a large-scale survey has taken place. The 
years in our database are 1970, 1977, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2005. Since in 2005 the survey only took 
place in Flanders, we are left with a panel of 232 observations. In this section we describe our data. 
We summarize the main descriptive statistics of all variables in Table 2. Figures 2 to 6 show the 
evolution of important variables graphically. To bring some structure - it is not practical to show data 
for all 42 districts - we select those Flemish and Walloon districts that are at the 20th, the 50th and 
the 80th percentile when ranked from low to high according to the change in the employment rate 
since 1970. So, these are relatively weak, median and relatively strong performers when it comes to 
change  in  the employment  rate.  In  Flanders  these  districts  are  respectively Gent,  Turnhout  and 
Brugge, in Wallonia Tournai, Nivelles and Waremme. For a detailed description of the construction of 
our data and their sources, we refer to Appendix 2.  
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the employment rate. We observe a fall in about all districts during 
the 1970s. In Wallonia employment continues to decline on average during the 1980s, whereas in 
Flanders it then recovers. During the 1990s and 2000s most Belgian districts show rising employment 
rates. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the rate of home ownership. This rate represents the fraction 
of houses that are occupied by their owner. The remaining fraction is occupied by renters. We 
observe a gradual increase in ownership in about all districts, although the size of this increase clearly 
differs across districts. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the relative cost of living as an owner versus a 
renter (RC). Tenure choice, i.e. whether to rent or to buy a house, is generally believed to depend on 
this variable. As in Hendershott & Shilling (1982) the cost of owning Pho is entered as the numerator, 
the cost of renting Pr as the denominator: 
RC = Pho / Pr 
 
No  data  exist  concerning  the  average  rental  rate  for  districts.  The  cost  of  renting  is  therefore 
approximated by the mean national index for nominal rents paid on a ‘normal’ house. For the cost 
experienced by owners, we adopt a model that basically corresponds to the ones used by Poterba 
(1992), Van den Noord (2005) and Cournède (2005). Our approach is however somewhat different 
from the estimations of Barrios García and Rodríguez and Hernández (2004) due to data restrictions. 
We calculate Pho as the sum of five distinct components: 
Pho = Ph(tc + ltv*Rm + (1-ltv)*Rg + d - p) 
with Ph the nominal price of a house, ‘tc’ the transaction cost in percent of the house price, Rm the 
percentage interest rate on mortgages, Rg the nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds, 
ltv the loan-to value ratio (i.e. the fraction of the house price that can be borrowed in the mortgage 
market), d a parameter which covers depreciation and maintenance costs and the risk premium on 
residential property in percent of the house price, and p the expected rate of house price inflation in 
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Figure2. The employment rate among 15-64 year olds living in the district (Empl)  
  
Source: Appendix 2.  
 
 
Figure 3. Home ownership rates (OWN) 
  
Source: Appendix 2. 
 
the  expression.  We  now  elaborate  on  the  different  parts  of  the  expression
5.  Ph  represents  the 
average nominal market price of an ordinary house in the district based on the registered sales of 
houses in that period. As such these prices are mainly representative for the secondary market of 
housing. Transaction costs in Belgium consist of registration duties on sales of existing houses, value 
                                                           
5 Compared to Barrios Garcia & Rodriguez Hernandez (2004) we were not able to acknowledge the user cost 
due to property taxes. As these taxes are levied at the regional, the provincial and the municipal level, these 
taxes cannot be transformed into a tax rate that holds for the districts without the risk of data bias. We also 
leave out the effect of the specific housing related deductions in the income tax. Data shortages especially in 






























































































































































Tournai Nivelles Waremme  14
added taxes when buying a house constructed within two years and specific taxes on the deposit of 
the mortgage contract. In addition one may think of extra costs related to the interference of a 
notary, solicitor or estate agent. For this study we restrict the transaction cost to the registration 
duties
6. Since these are paid only once (when buying the house), while ownership is generally a 
longer term investment, the transaction costs are recalculated into a yearly burden. To do this, an 
assumption must be made on the average buyer’s horizon. We impose a five year horizon, which is 
consistent with assumptions that we make later on when computing expected house price inflation 
(p). Robustness checks starting from alternative horizons did not affect the empirical results that we 
report in the next sections (see Appendix 3). For the interest rate Rm we use the nominal interest 
rate on mortgages under a semi-fixed interest rate regime. Since potential owners can only borrow a 
fraction of the amount needed to buy a house (ltv<1), they will also have to invest personal funds. 
We assume long-term government bonds to be the best alternative asset. The interest rate on these 
bonds (Rg) therefore determines the opportunity cost of invested personal funds. As to depreciation 
and maintenance costs and the risk premium on residential property (d), we follow the literature in 
assuming that these are equal to 3 percent of the mean nominal market price of an ordinary house. 
Finally,  the  p-variable  has  been  generated  as  forecasted  inflation  from  an  autoregressive model 
estimated for house prices. We regressed annual house price inflation in our panel of 42 districts on 
lagged inflation (up to five lags). The estimated coefficients were then used to forecast house price 
inflation of the coming years. p reflects the expected average annual house price inflation in the 
coming five years. Different choices for the number of years forecasted ahead had minor influence on 
our regression results. They never significantly affected the estimation results for the Oswald effect.  
We  were  able  to  compute  data  for  RC  on  an  annual  basis  since  the  early  1970s.  As  we  have 
mentioned before, to explain the rate of ownership in district i in year t in Equation (1), we use the 
average of RC in that district in the years t-4 to t. The reason to do this, is double. First, OWN being a 
stock variable, not only current relative costs will affect current ownership rates, but also recent 
ones, relating to the recent past. Second, annual relative cost data are relatively volatile, which 
makes today’s levels not always representative for the recent past. Again, changing the period over 
which we compute this average has no serious effects on our estimation results (see Appendix 3). 
Figure 4 shows the data. These show a strong increase in the relative cost of owning during the 1970s 
and (especially) the early 1980s, mainly due to very high real interest rates. Since then we observe a 
gradual decrease. Low interest rates and the expectation of strong house price increases in the 2000s 
explain the low relative cost in most districts in the most recent years.  
As to skill levels (Schooling) we were able to detract from the censuses the population of 14 years 
and older that has terminated school, sorted by their highest diploma. For our regressions we use the 
number of highly skilled people, i.e. people with tertiary education, in percent of the population of 
14 and older. Figure 5 shows the data for the six districts that we focus on. We observe a rise in each 
of  them.  Compared  to  most  other  variables,  differences  across  districts  are  quite  small  for  this 
variable (see also Table 2, between std. dev.). The wage gap in Figure 6 reflects the evolution of 
evolution of wage costs relative to productivity. More precisely, it has been computed as the ratio of 
                                                           
6 Until 2002 houses generated registration tax income for the government corresponding to 6% to 12.5% of the 
value of the house sold, the specific tax rate depending on the average imputed rents generated by the house 
and on characteristics of the buyer. From 2002 onwards, tax rates were reduced respectively to 5% and 10% in 
the  Flemish  region.  Additional  tax  base  reductions  were  installed  in  order  to  ease  the  entrance  of  first 
homebuyers on the housing market. Registration duties did not change in Wallonia.   15
Figure 4. Relative cost of being a home-owner versus a renter (RC) 
 
 Source: see Appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 5. The percentage of highly skilled people (14-... years old) (Schooling)
  
Source: Appendix 2. 
 
real compensation per employee (including taxes on labour) to a proxy for real productivity per 
employee
7. Our proxy is real GDP per capita. We prefer this variable above output per employee. The 
latter is highly endogenous, which may disturb appropriate measurement of the wage gap. A simple 
example can be illuminating. If wage increases are excessive, which pushes up the wage gap, firms 
                                                           
7 Due to lack of data at the level of individual districts in the 1970s, our wage and productivity data have been 






































































































































































Tournai Nivelles Waremme  16
may respond by laying off the least productive workers and by substituting capital for labour. As a 
result output per (remaining) worker may rise, and the wage gap may fall again. In the end, even if 
there is a serious problem of job losses, the wage gap may reveal nothing. Employing GDP per capita 
as a productivity measure makes the wage gap much less vulnerable to this perverse mechanism. 
Our data in Table 2 and Figure 6 are to be interpreted as an index, compared to a benchmark wage 
gap. As benchmark we chose the mean wage gap over all districts (called ‘Belgium’) in 1970. The data 
clearly show a derailment of wage costs in the seventies. During the eighties the wage gap is strongly 
reduced in Flanders, mainly thanks to higher productivity growth, with comparable wage growth. The 
wage gap remains much higher in Walloon districts.  Wages have not followed (downwards) the 
weaker evolution of productivity. The data in Table 2 confirm that the variation across districts 
(‘between std. dev.’) is much smaller for the wage level than for productivity. 
 
 
Figure 6. Wage gap with index ‘Belgium’ 1970 = 1 
 
Source: Appendix 2. 
 
A final series of variables in Table 2 are demographic and socio-geographic variables: the share of 
various  age  groups  in  total  population,  the  fraction  of  childless  households  (‘childless’)  and 
population  density  (‘PopDens’).  We  measure  the  latter  as  the  number  of  people  per  square 
kilometre.  As  we  have  mentioned  before,  relevant  age  groups  need  not  be  the  same  in  the 
ownership equation and the employment equation. We include the fraction of people aged 20 to 34 
and the fraction of people older than 34 in the ownership equation. We include the fraction of 
people aged 15 to 24 and the fraction of people aged 55 to 64 in the employment equation
8.  
                                                           
8 Also including the fraction of prime age workers in the employment equation implied coefficients which were 
highly insignificant and almost zero for this age group. Highly insignificant coefficients also resulted when we 

















































































Gent Turnhout Brugge Tournai Nivelles Waremme  17
5. Econometric methodology and results 
Tables 3 and 4 contain our main estimation results. In line with earlier arguments, we estimate both 
Equations (1) and (2) using the 2SLS estimation method, except in the last column where we use OLS. 
Endogenous variables to be instrumented in the equation for ownership are the employment rate, 
schooling, and the relative cost of living as owner. Endogenous variables to be instrumented in the 
employment equation are the rate of ownership, schooling, the wage level and productivity. As a 
result of the endogeneity of wages and productivity, also the wage gap is endogenous.  
  Good instruments should have explanatory power for the variable to be instrumented and be 
uncorrelated  to  shocks  uit  (eit)  in  the  employment rate  (home ownership  rate)  in  the  individual 
district. When it comes to instrumenting the relative cost of living as owner, wages, productivity and 
schooling in individual districts, it will be our hypothesis that the ‘aggregate’ regional counterparts of 
these  variables  contain  key  information  on  exogenous  drivers,  without  being  affected  to  any 
important extend by district-specific shocks. For Flemish districts these ‘aggregate’ regional variables 
are  the  average  relative  cost,  average  real  wage,  average  schooling,  etc. over  all  22  districts  in 
Flanders. For Walloon districts we use averages over all 20 districts in Wallonia. ‘Aggregate’ real 
wages for example will reflect changes in wage push variables like union power in key sectors in the 
region,  taxation,  and  (aggregate  regional)  labour  market  policies.  They  should  not  reflect 
idiosyncratic labour demand and employment shocks in individual districts. ‘Aggregate’ variables may 
of course reflect common shocks across districts, but due to the use of time dummies these common 
shocks will not show up in the error term. Along the same line of arguments, the ‘aggregate’ regional 
relative cost of living as owner will capture exogenous overall evolutions in house prices or aggregate 
regional policies affecting the relative cost (e.g. changes in transaction costs when buying a house). 
Again it is our assumption that they do not reflect idiosyncratic shocks affecting the relative cost of 
living as owner in an individual district. In addition to these ‘aggregate’ regional variables we use the 
exogenous variables from the ownership equation (demographic variables, population density) as 
instruments for ownership in the employment equation. Also, we add all exogenous demographic 
variables from the employment equation as instruments for the employment rate in the ownership 
equation.  
Standard Wald tests on the relevance of our set of instruments always yield F-values above 
15 (for relative cost RC) or even 20 (for wage, productivity, wage gap, schooling). Overidentification 
tests (Sargan tests) for their validity are reported at the bottom of Tables 3 and 4. In almost all 
equations the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is not rejected. 
 
Table 3 reports estimation results for the rate of ownership, Table 4 for the employment rate. Given 
that a Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, we use the fixed effects estimator. Columns with the same number in both 
tables correspond. Column (1) contains estimation results for our basic Equations (1) and (2). Column 
(2) adds a common dummy for all Flemish districts since 1990 to capture the potential differential 
effects on employment and ownership from regional policies since the end of the 1980s. Column (3) 
introduces  time-variation  in  the  effects  of  the  demographic  variables.  We  allow  effects  to  be 
different between the first part of the period that we study (1970-89), and the second (1990-2005). 
In column (4) we re-estimate column (3), but drop all highly insignificant explanatory variables. We 
maintain in the regression only those with an estimated p-value below 30%. The utter right column in 
each table re-estimates column (3) by the OLS method. In our discussion we focus on our main 
findings using the 2SLS method.  
   18
Table 3: Estimation results for the rate of home ownership (Equation 1) 
 
HOME-OWNERSHIP  1 – 2SLS     2 – 2SLS      3 – 2SLS     4 – 2SLS       3 - OLS  








  -0.024 
(0.020) 







(0.195)    -0.373(***) 
(0.122) 





(0.330)  -    0.282(*) 
(0.144) 
Fraction childless families             
1970-2005  -0.428 
(0.290)  
-0.457(*) 
(0.272)   -  -    - 
1970-1989  -  -  -0.397 
(0.244) 
-0.600(***) 
(0.127)    0.015 
(0.113) 
1990-2005  -  -  0.150 
(0.228)  -    0.496(***) 
(0.120) 
Fraction age 20-34              
1970-2005  -0.795 
(0.525) 
-0.616 
(0.556)  -  -    - 
1970-1989  -  -  -0.516 
(0.453) 
-0.816(**) 
(0.327)    0.022 
(0.304) 
1990-2005  -  -  0.109 
(0.456)  -    0.092 
(0.364) 
Fraction age 35 and older             
1970-2005  0.160 
(0.175)  
0.164 
(0.162)   -  -    - 
1970-1989  -  -  0.105 
(0.149)  -    0.055 
(0.122) 
1990-2005  -  -  0.084 
(0.179)  -    -0.077 
(0.146) 











-  0.014 





















(a)  0.47  0.44  0.46  0.97    - 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
District dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Number of observations  232  232  232  232    232 
 
 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
           (a) Sargan is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions are correct.  
 
 
When it comes to ownership, our results reveal a robust significant negative effect from the relative 
cost of living as owner and a positive effect from the employment rate. Given our specification, an 
increase of RC by 10 percent implies a fall in the rate of ownership by about 1 to 1.2 percentage 
points. The effect on the rate of ownership of a rise in employment is less precisely estimated, 
varying between about 0.5 and 1 percentage point for each percentage point rise in the employment 
rate. In two of our 2SLS regressions this effect is statistically significant at 5% or better, in a third it is   19
close to significance at the 10% level. These results illustrate the simultaneity that necessitates the 
use of IV methods in estimation of the Oswald effect. Furthermore, in line with our expectations, we 
observe significant negative effects on the rate of ownership from the fraction of childless families 
and  population  density.  This  negative  effect  of  the  fraction  of  childless  families  has,  however, 
gradually disappeared over time. We do no longer observe it in the last 15 years of our data (columns 
3 and 4). As to age composition, our results reveal the expected negative coefficient for the fraction 
of people aged 20 to 34 in column 2, but its estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. Time-
variation may (again) explain part of this. Columns (3) and (4) reveal that the negative effect occurs 
only in the 1970s and 1980s. Potential explanations could relate to changes in preferences and/or 
improved credit or financial conditions (for given relative cost of living as owner) in recent decades. 
Finally, we do not find significant effects from schooling in the ownership equation. Neither do we 
see a significant differential Flemish policy effect since 1990 (column 2), at least no differential effect 
for a given evolution of the relative cost. Any policy effect that runs via taxes and other determinants 
of the relative cost, is of course captured by the (significant) RC-variable.   
 
Our estimation results for the employment rate show significant negative effects of the rate of 
ownership and insignificant positive effects of the fraction of highly educated (schooling). The effects 
of productivity are significantly positive, the effects of real wages negative, although not always 
statistically significant. Given our findings in columns (1) and (2) that the effects of the wage level and 
productivity are not significantly different at all in absolute value, we introduce the wage gap in 
columns (3) and (4). This also obtains a significant negative effect. Furthermore, our results reveal a 
significant positive differential Flemish policy effect on the employment rate of about 2 percentage 
points since 1990. Finally, we find no significant effects from the demographic variables, although the 
negative sign of estimated effects is in line with expectations. Note also that this negative sign has 
become somewhat stronger in the most recent period.  
  Our results confirm the Oswald hypothesis. If we focus on our ‘better’ results in columns (2) 
and (3), considering R²s and Sargan test results, we find that a 1 percentage point rise in the rate of 
ownership in a district implies a significant fall in the employment rate in that district by about 0.3 
percentage  points.  Our  results  also  underscore  the  importance  of  the  estimation  method,  of 
controlling for fixed cross-sectional and common time effects, and of taking into account crucial 
other determinants of employment, when testing the Oswald hypothesis. We observe in the utter 
right column in Table 4 the bias that may follow from OLS estimation. Given the positive effect of the 
employment rate on ownership (Table 3), it should be no surprise to observe a much weaker Oswald 
effect  when  we  do  not  control  for  endogeneity.  We  still  find  a  significant  negative  effect  of 
ownership  on  employment,  but  its  estimated  size  falls  by  about  30  percent.  Table  5  contains 
estimation  results  where  we  do  not  control  for  fixed  cross-sectional  effects  and  common  time 
effects, or where we do not take into account some of the other determinants of employment. As 
one can see, anything goes. Not controlling for fixed district effects reduces the estimated negative 
Oswald coefficient by half (column 3_b in Table 5), but it remains statistically significant. If common 
time effects are not controlled for, the estimated Oswald coefficient becomes about zero (columns 
3_c and 3_d)
9. In other regressions that we have run, even a positive coefficient may show up
10.  
                                                           
9 Imagine for example business cycle shocks. Positive shocks may raise both employment, aggregate wages, 
and household confidence and resources, and the ambition to become owner. If not controlled for in the 
regressions, such a shock will induce positive correlation between ownership and the error term, and bias 
upwards the estimated Oswald coefficient.   
10 This is the case for example when we drop schooling from the regression in column 3_d (result not reported).   20
Our results in Table 5 may also shed light on the (somewhat surprising) insignificance of 
schooling in Table 4. An explanation may be that (in contrast to other variables) schooling shows a 
highly similar evolution over time in all districts. Even if this evolution is important for employment, 
its effects may at least partly be picked up by the common time dummies
11. Dropping these time 
dummies in Table 5 yields positive and highly significant schooling effects. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results for the employment rate (Equation 2) 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT  1 – 2SLS     2 – 2SLS     3 – 2SLS     4 – 2SLS       3 - OLS   







(0.087)    -0.236(***) 
(0.040) 





(0.117)  -    0.127(*) 
(0.073) 
Log (wage)  -0.320(*) 
(0.170) 
-0.200 
(0.153)  -  -    - 
Log (productivity)  0.401(***) 
(0.053) 
0.301(***) 
(0.059)  -  -    - 
Log (wage gap)  -  -  -0.262(***) 
(0.044) 
-0.257(***) 
(0.044)    -0.134(***) 
(0.024) 




































































































            (0.210) 
Dummy Flanders 1991-



























(a)  0.05  0.27  0.21  0.105    - 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
District dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Number of observations  232  232  232  232    232 
 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
           (a) Sargan is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions are correct.  
                                                           
11 The estimated time dummies in Table 4, column (3), are respectively 4.8%, 3.8%, 6%, 8.5% en 10.4% in 1977, 
1981, 1991, 2001 and 2005.   21
Finally, our results allow to assess the relative importance of the wage gap and ownership for the 
employment rate. Using the results in Table 4, column (3), a one standard deviation change in these 
two explanatory variables (see Table 2) implies an absolute change in the employment rate by about 
2.6 percentage points for ownership and 4.2 percentage points for the wage gap. These findings 
underscore the importance of housing and the arguments underlying the Oswald hypothesis for 
employment in Belgium. In this respect, our results are in line with earlier work by Estevão (2002) 
and  OECD  (2011).  Investigating  regional  labour  market  disparities  in  Belgium,  Estevão  finds  low 
labour migration, and concludes that “Belgians move too little”. He points at linguistic and cultural 
factors, a compressed wage structure and generous unemployment benefits to explain low mobility. 
Although our study is not about mobility, it would suggest a high rate of home ownership as another 
potential explanatory variable. OECD (2011) confirms the negative effect of home ownership on 
mobility. This study also indicates Belgium as a country with very high transaction costs of buying and 
selling houses. 
 
Table 5: Additional estimation results for the employment rate (Equation 2) 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT  3_b – 2SLS   3_c  - 2SLS   3_d – 2SLS     5 – 2SLS  6 – 2SLS 




















Log (wage)  -  -  -  -  -0.388(*) 
(0.212) 
Log (productivity)  -  -  -  0.284(***) 
(0.047)  - 





(0.020)  -  - 










































































































(a)  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.01 
Time dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
District dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  232  232  232  232  232 
 
Note: * (**) (***) indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%) (1%). Between brackets are estimated standard errors. 
           (a) Sargan is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions are correct.    22
Table 6 summarizes the results of a series of additional regressions that we have run, and where we 
include not just OWN in the employment regression, but also one interaction term OWN*VAR, where 
VAR stands for a structural variable which may affect the size of the Oswald effect. The data in the 
table indicate the change in the estimated effect of the rate of ownership on the employment rate 
brought  about  by  the  interaction  variable.  One  column  shows  the  results  from  including  each 
interaction term separately, the other from including all interaction terms together but dropping 
those with p-values below 20%. Our results reveal a weaker Oswald effect in districts with a higher 
share  of  highly  educated  people,  thereby  confirming  Dohmen  (2005).  This  result  is  statistically 
significant  at  6%.  As  to  other  interaction  terms,  we  find  a  stronger  Oswald  effect  in  densely 
populated districts and in districts closer to a linguistic or country border. Densely populated districts 
may for example be more vulnerable to congestion problems (and rising production costs) when 
owners commute. Proximity of a border may imply higher costs to be mobile (e.g. personal costs due 
to a change of language, or transaction costs due to a shift of legal regime). We also observe weaker 
Oswald effects in districts closer to the main cores of economic activity (i.e. districts close the major 
cities).  None  of  these  differences  are  statistically  significant,  however.  Neither  do  we  observe 
important differences in the Oswald effect over time. Additional tests with different time periods 
than those reported in Table 6 did not yield any interesting results. 
 
 
Table 6: Influence of structural and socio-geographic variables on estimated Oswald coefficient
 
 
Determinants of the Oswald effect. 
Different effect... 









(and p-value < 20%) 
for districts at a national or linguistic border? 
District where at least 30% of the municipalities are situated 





for districts close to an economic centre / major city (b)? 
Districts close to an economic centre (versus other districts) 
+0.040  - 
in the past versus more recent periods? 
Change in estimated Oswald coefficient for 1990-2005 
(versus 1970-1989) 
-0.076  - 
for densely populated areas? 
Effect of a rise in population density by one standard 
deviation (= +226 persons per square kilometre) (c) 
-0.070   -0.130 ..     
depending on the share of highly educated people ? 
Effect of a rise in the fraction of highly educated by one 
standard deviation (= +2.45 percentage points in ‘schooling’) (c) 
+0.043   +0.081 (*) 
Note:  (*)  statistically significant at less than 10%.  
            (a) A negative change points at a stronger Oswald effect. 
            (b) Our interaction term is a dummy which equals 1 in districts neighbouring the districts of the major cities/cores of economic 
activity (i.e. Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Liege and Charleroi). 
            (c) Standard deviations are determined over the 42 district averages for population density/schooling over 1970-2005. These  
                 district averages are also the data for VAR that we use in the interaction term (cf. OWN*VAR).    
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6. Conclusions 
This paper tests the Oswald hypothesis in a panel of 42 Belgian districts since the 1970s. Oswald 
argues that high rates of home ownership restrict geographical mobility, and imply inferior labour 
market outcomes, both for the individual and in the aggregate. The use of data going back to 1970 
allows  us  to  embed  the  Oswald  hypothesis  in  a  broader  model  including  important  other 
determinants of employment like labour costs and productivity, the skill level of the population, and 
a number of demographic variables. Considering that ownership may be endogenous to (shocks in) 
employment, we use IV estimation methods.  
Overall,  we  find  evidence  in  favour  of  the  Oswald  hypothesis.  We  observe  that  a  1 
percentage point rise in the rate of home ownership in a district implies a statistically significant fall 
in  the  employment  rate  by  about  0.3  percentage points.  The  size  of  this  effect  is  economically 
important. It is more than half the effect of changes in labour costs. Additional estimation reveals 
that  the  Oswald  effect  is  smaller  in  districts  with  higher  fractions  of  high  skilled.  Our  results 
underscore the importance of controlling for unobserved fixed regional and common time effects, of 
including  other  determinants  of  employment,  and  of  appropriately  dealing  with  endogeneity. 
Disregarding these issues (as is often done in the literature), may imply very different estimation 
results.  As  to  these  other  determinants  of  employment,  our  results  confirm  the  existence  of 
significant negative effects of the ratio of wage costs to productivity. We also observe positive effects 
from the skill level of the population, but here the evidence is not strong. Interestingly, we also find 
significant positive effects on employment in Flemish districts from differential regional policies that 
gained importance since the 1990s. These policies include among others the management of public 
employment services and the training of the unemployed.  
 
We embed our study of the Oswald hypothesis in a simultaneous equation model where we also 
explain the rate of home ownership. We find significant negative effects from the relative cost of 
living as owner versus renter. A 10 percent increase in this relative cost implies a fall in the rate of 
ownership by about 1 to 1.2 percentage point. In the ownership equation, we also see an influence 
from some demographic variables. The rate of ownership tends to be lower when the fraction of 
young  people  (20  to  34)  and  the  fraction  of  childless  families  rise.  This  negative  influence  has, 
however,  become  insignificant  since  the  1990s.  Our  findings  here  are  in  line  with  hypotheses 
emphasizing changes in preferences or financial liberalisation improving credit availability for young 
households. 
The significant effect on home ownership from the relative cost of living as owner versus 
renter opens possibilities for the government to affect home ownership by means of tax changes. 
The  literature  provides  ample  reasons  why  promotion  of  ownership  may  make  sense.  Home 
ownership may be a secure way for the population to accumulate assets. Moreover, it may generate 
significant social benefits, like neighbourhood stability and the accumulation of social capital. Policy 
makers should recognize however that these benefits come at a labour market cost, which may 
necessitate complementary policy measures to avoid negative ownership effects on geographical 
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Appendix 1: Belgian provinces and 
 
 
Average size of a district : 723 km²
Average number of inhabitants per district
Wallonia (5 provinces, 
20 districts) 
26
provinces and districts 
Average size of a district : 723 km² 
per district: 214.000 
 
 
Flanders (5 provinces, 
22 districts)   27
Appendix 2: Data Description and Sources 
Most our data have been taken from the national censuses held in Belgium. Because we only had 
censuses in the years 1970, 1981 and 1991, we had to supplement these with data from extensive 
surveys (Social-Economic Survey, Woonsurvey). These surveys have been tested and confirmed to be 
representative by the statistical authorities (NIS). Not every variable is available in the censuses and 
surveys, so for some data we had to rely on other sources. We now consider every variable of our 
model  and  give  a  short  description  of  definition.  We  mention  data  sources  and  possible  data 
shortages or adjustments. 
OWN (Home-ownership rate) 
The fraction of houses that are occupied by their owner. 
Source:  Census  1970,  1981  and  1991  by  NIS;  Social-Economic  Survey  1977  and  2001  by  NIS; 
Woonsurvey 2005 by the Flemish Government. Data for 2005 are not available for the Walloon 
districts. 
 
RC (Relative cost of being a home-owner versus a renter) 
This  variable  has  been  explained  in  the  main  text.  The  sources  of  the  different  parts  are: 
* Pho: The mean nominal transaction price of a normal house per district. Source: yearly data (1973-
2008) from ADSEI. We have extrapolated these district data to the pre-1973 years using the regional 
(= Flemish or Walloon) mean evolution of house prices according to STADIM. 
* tc: Nominal registration duty. In percentage of house price, divided by an estimate of expected 
duration of the length in years of the amortization period. We conjecture this period to be 5 years. As 
a robustness check, we alternatively assume this period to be 30 years (see Appendix 3). 
Source:  http://www.belgium.be/nl/belastingen/registratierechten/onroerend_goed/  and  annual 
reports ‘FOD Financiën’. 
* Rm: Nominal interest rate on mortgages, interest rate on mortgages under a semi-fixed interest rate 
regime. Source: National Bank of Belgium. 
* Rg : Nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. 
* ltv: loan-to-value ratio. Source: Japelli and Pagano (1994), Chiuri and Japelli (2003), IMF (2006). 
* d: Depreciation, maintenance and the risk premium on residential property (in percentage of the 
transaction house price. No actual data are available but we held d to the 3 percent of the house 
price per year as described in previous empirical studies. 
* Pr: The yearly nominal rental rate. This is a mean national index for rents paid on a ‘normal’ house. 
Data per district are not available. Source: ‘FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie’ 
 
Empl (Labour market performance, employment rate) 
Employment rate among households living in the district, i.e. the number of employed in percent of 
the population at working age. Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 
2001  by  NIS;  ‘Steunpunt  Werk  en  Sociale  Economie’  for  2005.  The  data  for  1977  have  been 
interpolated from the years 1970 and 1981. 
 
Demographic variables 
·  Age  xx-yy:  People  of  age  between  xx  and  yy  in  percent  of  the  total  population. 
Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991 by NIS; Social-Economic Survey 2001 by NIS for 2001,   28
and 'FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie’ for 2005 (Rijksregister). The data for 
1977 have been interpolated from the years 1970 and 1981. 
·  Childless: The number of couples without children divided by the total number of families. 
Source: Census 1970, 1981, 1991 and ADSEI for 1997-2006. 1977 has been interpolated from 
1970 and 1981. 
Schooling 
The number of highly skilled people (tertiary education) in percent of the population of age 14 or 
older. Source: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991; Eurostat for 2001. 1977 has been interpolated from 1970 
and 1981. 2005 has been extrapolated from 2001 based on the data of 2001 and the evolution of the 
national mean according to NIS Labour Force Survey. 
Wage level 
Real compensation per employee. Source: own calculations based on Cambridge Econometrics data. 
Data  for  1970  and  1977  have  been  extrapolated  based  on  NIS  Social  Statistics.  Due  to  data 
limitations, wages have been computed at the level of the provinces. Provinces include about 4 
districts on average. 
 
Productivity 
Real GDP per capita. Source: own calculations based on Cambridge Econometrics data. Per capita 
GDP  in  1970  and  1977  have  been  extrapolated  based  on  Cambridge  Econometrics  and  OECD 
Economic Outlook data. Due to data limitations, productivity has been computed at the level of the 
provinces. Provinces include about 4 districts on average. 
 
Wage gap 
Ratio of wage level to productivity. 
 
PopDens 
Population density, number of people per square kilometre. 
Sources: district area: Eurostat; district population: Census 1970, 1981 and 1991, Social-Economic 
Survey 2001, 1977 has been interpolated from 1970 and 1981. 2005: Ecodata, ‘FOD Economie, KMO, 
Middenstand en Energie’ (Rijksregister). 
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks 
 
We here report the results of robustness checks to column (3) in Tables 3 and 4. We report estimated 
coefficients for the relative cost of living as owner (RC) in the ownership equation, and estimated 
coefficients for the rate of ownership (OWN) in the employment equation, after introducing one 
change to the empirical specification, or the computation of our data. This change is indicated in the 




Note:  (*), (**), (***) statistically significant at less than 10% (5%) (1%).  
(a)  The Oswald effect as we report it in this paper (i.e. dEmpl/dOWN) can be derived as the estimated coefficient (-0.196) divided 
by the level of OWN. Evaluated at the overall sample mean (70%), this implies an Oswald effect equal to -0.28.  
(b)  The Oswald effect as we report it in this paper (i.e. dEmpl/dOWN) can be derived as the estimated coefficient multiplied by the 
level of Empl. Evaluated at the overall sample mean (57%), this implies an Oswald effect equal to -0.37.                 
 
 
Robustness checks: coefficients in case we...  RC  OWN 
Include log(OWN) instead of OWN, both as dependent 





(0.051)          
Include log(Empl)  instead of Empl, both as dependent 










Include log(RCt) instead of log(RCt-4,t) in Eq. (1) 
 
Here we do not include the (log of the) average of annual data 
for RC over a five year period ending in t, but only use data for 





Include log(RCt-4,t) but assume owners to have an horizon of 
30 years in the computation of RC. 
 
We assume transaction costs to be spread over 30 years, and 
expected inflation (p) equal to the average annual house price 





Compute the employment rate as the ratio of the number 





Drop the year 1977 (for which many data were missing and had 





Drop the year 2005 (for which ownership data were missing for 
Walloon districts, and some other sources had to be explored for 





Drop the years 1977 and 2005  -0.080 
(0.070) 
-0.356(***) 
(0.107) 